100세 동갑내기, 백선엽 장군을 떠나
보내며

[아무튼, 주말] 김형석의 100세일기

일러스트= 김영석

지난 주말이었다. 경북 안동에 사는 사람의 이야기를

전해 들었다.경북 칠곡군 '다부동 전적기념관'에서도

자유수호의 영웅이던 백선엽 장군의 분향소가 차려져

추모 행렬이 이어졌다고 한다.헌화하면서 '나같이 이름

없는 국민 한 사람도 이렇게 마음이 아픈데 백 장군의

친구인 김형석 교수의 슬픔은 얼마나 클까' 생각했다는

것이다.

그는 지난 1월 조선일보에 실린 사진을 스크랩해

두었는데 그것을 가슴에 안고 엎드려서 엉엉 소리

내어 울었다고 했다. 내가 백 장군과 '문무(文武)

100년의 대화'를 하고 장군의 휠체어를 밀어주는

장면을 촬영한 사진이었다. 나도 참고 있던 눈물을

닦았다.사실 나와 백 장군은 오랜 사귐을 갖지

못했다. 나이는 같고 고향도 가까웠다.백 장군보다는

내가 더 오래 그분을 존경해 왔다.

나는 교수다운 교수로 살고 싶었으나 성공하지 못

했고, 백 장군은 한평생을 군인다운 군인의 모범을

보여주었다. 조선일보 주선으로 백세가 되어 서로

만났을 때 내가 장군의 고향인 평남 강서의 약수터

얘기를 했다. 그가 놀라는 표정으로 쳐다보면서

"우리고향에 간 일이 있느냐"고 물었다. 약수를

받기 위해 어려서 어른들을 따라가기도 했다는 얘기를

듣고는 90년 전 고향 생각에 잠겼다.

그렇게 환하게 웃을 수가 없었다. 우리 둘 다

해방후에는 고향에 가지 못하는 실향민이 되었다는

공감대가 있었을 것이다.아직도 친일파 얘기가 나온다.

일제강점기에는 모든 분야에서 일본인보다 앞서는

사람이 존경스러운 애국자였다. 작곡가이자 지휘자인

안익태와 무용가 최승희가 그래서 선망의 대상이었다.

그런데 최승희는 북한에 남았기 때문에 애국적

무용인으로 존대받고, 대한민국 현충원에 잠든

안익태에게는 친일 누명을 씌우곤 한다.

몇 해 전 안익태의 부인과 따님이 서울을 방문했을때

점심을 같이했다. 세상 떠나기 전 남편의 무덤을

한 번 더 찾아보고 싶어서였다. 남편과 아버지의 나라

대한민국에 대한 이 모녀의 애정과 자부심은 우리보다

더 간절했다. 스페인에는 안익태 거리가 있을 정도이다.

백 장군은 나보다 7개월 늦게 태어났다. 24세를

넘기면서 해방을 맞았다. 그때부터 76년간 대한민국을

위해 헌신했다.영웅이라는 명예를 바친다면 그는 영웅

중의 영웅이다. 대한민국 군인 중의 군인이었다.

나 같은 위치의 국민으로서는 상상하기 힘들 정도의

애국자였다. 백 장군이 대한민국을 사랑한 것은

군인이었기 때문만이 아니다. 6·25 참전용사들과

함께  피를 흘리며 수호한 그 자유세계가 전쟁 후

번영하는 과정을 보았기 때문이다.

우리는 그들, 즉 자유를 위해 생명을 바친 영웅들이

있었기에 자유 민주국가에 사는 영광과 행복을 누리고

있다. 서울 현충원의 많은 전우와 백 장군 주변에

잠들어 있는 영웅들의 희생정신을 감사히 받들어야 한다.

백 장군은 우리는 물론 후손과 민족 전체를 위해 산

선구자의 한 사람이다.

출처 : 조선일보

July 24, 2020 Topic: Security Region:

Asia Tags: China

Richard Nixon Henry Kissinger

Mike Pompeo Donald Trump

The True Lessons of Nixon and Kissinger’s China Strategy

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech at the Nixon Library misunderstood Richard M. Nixon’s geopolitical approach to China.
by Harry J. Kazianis Follow Grecianformula on TwitterL

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In a historic speech yesterday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a blistering attack on China at the Nixon Library in California
that seeks to recalibrate American policy toward China. But it misunderstood Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s
fundamental approach. Instead of seeking confrontation with China, Nixon and Kissinger sought to play the “China Card”
by deploying it against the Soviet Union.

While the speech itself needs to be read in its entirety, Pompeo’s remarks, which represent a coordinated
effort to recalibrate U.S. foreign policy towards China in a number of different speeches over the last few weeks
by other senior Trump Administration officials, clearly mean only one thing: Trump’s top foreign policy officials are pushing
for a move from an engagement and peaceful competition with Beijing to what can only be described as
a twenty-first-century version of Cold War-style containment. Indeed, Pompeo clearly meant for his remarks
to be interpreted as the “Evil Empire” speech of 2020. Whether Trump himself will adopt this course remains an open question.
While Pompeo was careful not to attack former President Nixon for his decision to engage with China,
there was no mention of the reasons why Nixon and Kissinger made this historic move, which was unquestionably
the right move at the right time. Pompeo quotes from a famous 1967 Foreign Affairs piece by Nixon that made
the case for engagement with China. Nixon wrote,
“Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of the family of nations…
The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus, our aim – to the extent we can, we must influence events.
Our goal should be to induce change [emphasis mine].”
to mask their true geopolitical ambitions–it makes such aspirations more easily tolerable in today’s world,
providing a sort of moralistic blanket to hide their real intentions. In this instance, Nixon was fully cognizant
that the U.S. was struggling thanks to the large financial and military commitments needed to sustain
the Vietnam War and that the Soviet Union needed to be checked. In short, Nixon did not seek
to change China in America’s image, as Pompeo suggests. Rather, Beijing and Washington agreed
to cooperate because they both viewed the rise of Soviet power as a bigger threat to their shared mutual interests.
Realpolitik, in other words, ruled.

The conservative journalist Hugh Hewitt appeared to sense this lack of historical context in Pompeo’s remarks.
He asked Pompeo in the opening question:
“My first question has to do with the context of the president’s visit in 1972. You mentioned the Soviet Union was isolated
but it was dangerous. He went to the People’s Republic of China in 1972 to try and ally and combine interests
with them against the Soviet Union; it was successful. Does Russia present an opportunity now to the United States
to coax them into the battle to be relentlessly candid about the Chinese Communist Party?”

Pompeo replied:
“So I do think there’s that opportunity. That opportunity is born of the relationship, the natural relationship
between Russia and China, and we can do something as well. There are places where we need to work with Russia.
Today – or tomorrow, I guess it is, our teams will be on the ground with the Russians working on
a strategic dialogue to hopefully create the next generation of arms control agreements like Reagan did.
It’s in our interest, it’s in Russia’s interest. We’ve asked the Chinese to participate. They’ve declined to date.
We hope they’ll change their mind.
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It’s these kind of things – these proliferation issues, these big strategic challenges – that if we work alongside Russia,
I’m convinced we can make the world safer. And so there – I think there is a place for us to work with the Russians to achieve
a more likely outcome of peace not only for the United States but for the world.”
Pompeo’s speech should have encompassed why Nixon wanted better relations with China:
the rise of Soviet power and a widespread belief America was in decline. America has ample ways to use alliances and
partnerships with nations that it may not exactly align with naturally to contain China‘s own rise. When we forget
why Nixon and Kissinger made the foreign policy choices they did, America’s national interests suffer.
Now, as then, Nixon and Kissinger’s approach to international relations offers important lessons that we ignore at our peril.

Argument

Pompeo’s Strategy Depends on Beijing’s Own Paranoia
The U.S. secretary of state is raising the temperature

with China to force decoupling.
By James Palmer | July 24, 2020, 5:23 PM
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo speaks at

the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum

in Yorba Linda,California, on July 23.

Kent Nishimura/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images,

In what was billed as a landmark speech on Thursday,

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
launched a fusillade of attacks on China, which he called

"increasingly authoritarian at home,
and more aggressive in its hostility to freedom everywhere else.”

The speech, which Pompeodelivered at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

and Museum in Yorba Linda, California,
came after months of intensifying hostile actions between Beijing and

Washington, includingthe abrupt order on Tuesday by the United States

to close the Chinese consulate in Houston,
China’s denunciations of the United States, and a statement by

Pompeo explicitly opposing China’s claims in the South China Sea.

In his speech, Pompeo articulated a view that is increasingly popular

in Washington policymaking circles:
that the implicit bargain past administrations struck with Beijing

to hold off on ideological criticism and geopolitical containment

in exchange for mutually profitable economic growth was a bad deal for
the United States. Pompeo offered few signs of what a more productive

approach might look like,however, or how to disentangle the U.S.

and Chinese economies without causing a disaster for both.
According to Pompeo’s account, Washington’s new strategy is to

"engage and empower" the Chinese people—a dynamic, freedom-loving people

who are completely distinct fromthe Chinese Communist Party.” He repeated

a call for an alliance of “free world” states against China, but it was

short on either details or the credibility needed to bring allies on board.

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Like other recent actions driven by the most hawkish elements in the

Trump administration, Pompeo’s speech was instead aimed at deliberately

riling the Chinese government in order to put pressure on U.S. businesses

and constrain America’s strategic options.

The idea of appealing to the Chinese people, rather than to the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP),is flawed for numerous reasons. The CCP is deeply

woven into the fabric of ordinary Chinese life,
and the propaganda message that “Without the party, there would be no

new China”—which can be strikingly effective—starts in elementary school.

While there is plenty of resentment and anger among
the Chinese people over individual issues, from government corruption

to attacks on COVID-19 whistleblowers, there is no evidence that it directly

translates into large-scale questioning ofthe CCP’s legitimacy. Even people

who dislike the party in the abstract are likely to side with
it against a hostile foreign government.

Even if the Chinese people did yearn to throw off the shackles

of communism, the administration
Pompeo serves has done nothing to either engage or empower them.

Instead, President Donald Trump has used racist terms such as

"kung flu”; made the visa process for Chinese visiting,
studying, or immigrating to the United States more tortuous; and

shuttered grassroots engagement programs,
such as the Peace Corps in China, meant to present a friendly American

face to ordinary Chinese people.
Assessing Chinese public opinion is a tricky business, but no evidence

suggests the kind of radical gulf between ruler and ruled that emerged

in Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Claims that the Chinese masses are
ready to reject the CCP come from highly unreliable groups such as

Tuidang—which claims to be a "emerging non-violent movement” but is run

from abroad by Falun Gong, a banned but well-funded Chinese
religious movement with close ties to the Trump administration.

Tuidang says, fictitiously, that “350 million Chinese people have

renounced the notorious Chinese Communist Party.”

Pompeo’s call for “free nations to act” and insist on reciprocity

and transparency with China,coupled with his accusation that U.S. allies

not willing to stand up to China are cowards,rings hollow coming from

an administration that has decimated U.S. diplomacy. Countriessuch

as Germany—which Pompeo hinted at without naming—may display moral cowardice
toward Beijing in the service of their trade interests, but they’ve

also been alienated by Washington’s behavior. The Trump administration’s

actions have made it all too easy to level
charges of equivalence between Washington and Beijing, whether it’s

putting children in detention camps or lying about coronavirus data.

Pompeo’s description of Beijing’s actions,“alienating potential allies,

breaking trust at home and abroad, rejecting property rights
and predictable rule of law,” could describe his own government.

Pompeo demanded reciprocity against Beijing, without laying out what

such reciprocity entails for allied nations, or what its purpose should

be save the inchoate idea of getting tough with China.
Perhaps the real goal of the California speech was not to appeal to allies

or even the American people,but to spur action from China itself that

would further the agenda of Pompeo and other hard-line China hawks,
such as Trump trade advisor Peter Navarro. Navarro and others have long

been advocates of acomprehensive economic decoupling between

the two countries, snapping the business ties that
they see empowering the CCP at the cost of the United States.

Pompeo’s speech repeatedly referred to the failings of American investment

in China and to Beijing’s duplicitous business dealings.

There are plenty of moral and pragmatic arguments for decoupling and

against it. However necessary it might be, it likely would come with

enormous economic costs—a price that went unmentioned in
the speech, save for a single note of the fact that China, unlike

the Soviet Union, is tightly integrated
into the global economy. Left unsaid was that for ordinary American consumers, decoupling would mean much higher prices on the cheap

Chinese manufactured goods that have done so much to
boost the U.S. standard of living. For U.S. businesses,

decoupling would mean paying the massive costs of relocating enterprises and

forfeiting billion-dollar investments.

A government comprehensively committed to decoupling might be able to

allay these problems,by making its case to the American people and by

offering support to U.S. businesses.
Yet the president has shown no great enthusiasm for wide decoupling,